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 In this paper contributions to the theory of economic growth are discussed, 
starting from the standard Harrod-Domar's model, R. Solow's neo-oclassical model 
and the model of growth by the new Cambridge school to modern trends in the 
theory of growth which focus on the development of dynamic models. Dynamic 
models include macroeconomic aggregates such as the inflation rate, money supply 
and government expenditure. Special attention has been paid to the approach 
based on the theory of rational expectations. 
 The author shows that the current relationship constellation of key categories 
in the Croatian economy is not, either from a static or from a dynamic point of 
view, particularly favorable for autonomous formation of strong short-term impulses 
for economic growth with the relative stability of prices being sustained. From the 
time when hyperinflation was being stopped, and at reasonable economic and 
social costs, the goal of the economic policy has evolved into a much more subtle 
and multi-dimensional demand for inducing economic growth at a low inflation 
rate. Within this framework the author points to the restrictions of the prevailing 
orthodox approach to the transformation of economies in transition, and due to 
its orientation only towards those policies which enable market incentives, he 
suggests that there is a need for broadening such a conceptual framework. 
 
 
 Despite numerous extensive studies throughout decades, economists still 
do not fully understand why and how economies grow. So, for example, 
measures leading to high inflation rates in some countries, do not lead to 
equal results in others. While in some fast growing countries investments 
make a large portion of their gross national product, other countries with 
the same portion of investments do not have or did not have high infla-
tion rates. Economists are still not sure whether it is some combination of 
institutional changes, changes in investment, labour, savings and risk taking 
incentives, changes in the accumulation of production factors, changes in 
economic policies (trade, fiscal, monetary) or just changed luck that creates 
conditions for a faster growth of an economy compared to other 
economies. 
 Economic growth and stability are two highly complex phenomena, so 
that even today, despite a highly developed economic theory, we cannot 
say for sure either which are all the factors of growth and in what way 
they contribute to it, or what is crucial to the realization and maintenance 
of stability or a low inflation rate. The development of the theory of en-
dogenous growth, which has explicitly introduced human capital into stan-
dard theories of growth, and the development of institutional economy 
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somewhat reduced the size of the “unknown ground”. On the other hand, 
the theory of rational expectations has been a significant supplement to 
the rudimentary Keynesian instrument for the analysis of inflation and sta-
bilization policy. However, from a theoretical point of view, little light has 
been shed on the relationship between growth and macroeconomic stability, 
which is why there isn't sufficient empirical evidence. Due to all these re-
strictions, it is not quite possible to draw relevant economic and political 
conclusions. 
 In the absence of a potentially universal theory of growth, all govern-
ments striving to increase the growth rate while maintaining stability are 
trying to find their way on this theoretically and empirically still relatively 
unknown territory. The same is true of international financial institutions 
which strive to ensure the growth and stability of world economy. In this 
context a relatively firm stand has developed, which is, due to the above 
stated reasons, empirical rather than theoretical, that macroeconomic stabil-
ity and efficient functioning of the market in all its segments are essential 
to a stable and sustainable growth. In view of this, at all levels of eco-
nomic policy implementation, special attention is paid to policies of macro-
economic stabilization and structural adjustment which are used in an ef-
fort to affect the key growth factors such as savings, investments in physi-
cal and human capital, capital productivity and technological advance. 
 There is a general consensus on macroeconomic balance and stabiliza-
tion as prerequisites of growth. A large body of evidence supports the 
stand that high inflation is incompatible with growth. There isn't a single 
state which has achieved stable and long-run growth in circumstances of a 
very high inflation rate. However, such an assertion is even less clear in 
circumstances of a low, but still positive inflation rate. In other words, 
growth does not necessarily require inflation to drop to zero. As far as 
the relationship of growth and inflation is concerned, the widespread no-
tion that moderate inflation and growth can be positively correlated in a 
short-term, cyclic context, but are negatively correlated in a medium- and 
long-term one, has not been clearly confirmed by empirical research either. 
Namely, while in the fifties and sixties it was still possible to find empiri-
cal confirmation of the positive correlation in a short-term context, which 
was expressed in the well-known Phillips's curve, in the seventies and 
eighties, this correlation could no longer be empirically confirmed, and this 
was expressed in the Friedman-Phelps's version of the Phillips' curve, ac-
cording to which cyclical unemployment can drop under the natural rate 
only if the actual inflation exceeds the expected inflation. 
 Only the most recent study by Bruno and Easterly (1994) provided 
conclusive empirical confirmation of the negative correlation between 
growth and inflation. But, while in circumstances of high inflation negative 
correlation is unequivocal, in circumstances of low and moderate inflation 
this relationship has still remained empirically inconclusive. The finding 
that as a rule investments take longer to recover than growth is a very 
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interesting one since it points to some more recent findings about the in-
vestments ensuing growth, rather than the other way round. 
 
 On theory 
 The approach of the modern theory of economic growth to the study 
of economy springs from the work of J.M. Keynes. But, while Keynes fo-
cussed on the short-term problem of full utilization of a given production 
capacity with the volume of capital and labour being fixed, theories of 
growth are more concerned with circumstances in which the demand and 
production capacity can both grow in the long run. 
 First contributions to the theory of growth were made by R. Harrod 
and E. Domar, who independently, starting from different positions, 
reached the same conclusions. The essence of Harrod's view of the eco-
nomic process can be reduced to two hypotheses. The first one is that 
capital and labour have to be combined in a fixed ratio imposed by the 
current technology, which means that a fixed amount of capital and labour 
is needed for the production of one gross national product unit. The sec-
ond hypothesis is that the community wants to spend a constant portion 
of income, with the rest representing savings. Capital growth rate is the 
ratio between two constant flows, savings and investments per production 
unit, which is dictated by technology. If we want the total amount of 
capital to be fully utilized at any time, then the above ratio is at the 
same time the rate at which the production must grow, and it represents, 
to use Harrod's terms, the “guaranteed economic growth rate”. To main-
tain full employment, with a fixed amount of labour and capital per one 
production unit, the production growth rate must equal the labour growth 
rate, which Harrod calls “natural growth rate”. Domar's approach differs 
from Harrod's in the way that the total amount of capital and technologi-
cal laws determining the production are not explicitly stated, and therefore 
the emphasis is on the dual role of investments. 
 The Harrod-Domar's frame of mind has resulted in at least two impor-
tant conclusions: 1) long-run economic growth cannot be the goal of any 
economic policy, or at least cannot represent the goal of common mone-
tary and fiscal policies of the Keynesian type, since the only growth rate 
that can be justified is the “natural” growth rate, which the government 
can only attempt to influence provided it has ways and means to stimulate 
technical advances. 2) the state of balanced growth in circumstances of full 
engagement of labour and capital is a mythical state of economy which 
can be achieved only if there is full employment and provided that the 
population growth rate plus technical advance rate do not equal the de-
sired savings/income ratio divided by the capital/production ratio. 
 According to J. Schumpeter's theory of economic growth the profit 
made due to inventions is taken away by the competition which imitates 
new production processes, but, on the other hand, workers and consumers 
 
Brki}, L., Theory of Economic Growth..., Politi~ka misao, Vol. XXXIII, (1996), No. 5, pp. 17—32 20 
                                                                                                                                              
benefit from reduced prices. The increase in interest rates which is stimu-
lated by inventions soon leads to new savings and capital accumulation un-
til the accumulation of the increased capital stock results in diminishing 
returns, decrease of profit and minimal interest rate. However, this is 
when a new explosion of inventions occurs, which again puts the economic 
system into a process of dynamic motion until the process of economic 
growth is renewed. 
 In the original Smith-Malthus's model of economic growth, the relation-
ship between land and production and that between labour and production 
was not constant. Similarly, the relationships between capital and produc-
tion in Ricardo-Marx-Solow's model are not expected to be constant in 
technical terms. In the absence of technical changes, efficient capital for-
mation on the part of society would enable production growth, and the 
resulting phenomenon of diminishing returns would allow the ratio between 
capital and production to grow as a constant. Many contemporary econo-
mists (R. Eisner, A. Hansen, G. Colm) advocate the view that the ratio 
between capital and production is practically a technical constant and any 
attempt to accumulate capital through the rate required by annual growth 
is soon to fail. 
 Applying his own analysis method R. Solow has reached the following 
conclusion: less than half of the increase in productivity in the USA, both 
per capita and in terms of real wages, can be ascribed to the increase in 
capital itself. In other words, according to statistics throughout history, 
more than half of the increased production results from scientific break-
throughs rather than from savings and accumulation. 
 This model represents an illustration of a well-organized and stable so-
ciety the prosperity of which depends on the thriftiness, inventiveness and 
technical ability of its members, in which each member is rewarded ac-
cording to their contribution to common welfare: here we have clearly en-
tered the neo-classical sphere.1 In circumstances of balanced growth, the 
percentage of output growth per capita between two periods can be en-
tirely ascribed to technical advances since the percentage of capital growth 
equals the percentage of effective labour force growth, and the total 
amount of capital per efficiency unit is, accordingly, constant. 
 The problem with the neo-classical explanation of stable states lies in 
the fact that this approach basically relies on special technological precon-
ditions, which are expressed in the form of a mathematical equation enti-
tled “aggregative production function”, which establishes the relationship 
between aggregative production and aggregative capital and employed 
workers. J. Robinson (1953) was first to suggest that capital represents a 
 
  1On the basic neo-classical model see R.M. Solow: “A contribution to the 
theory of economic growth”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1956, and T. Swan: 
“Economic growth and capital accumulation”, Economic Record, 1956. 
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set of heterogeneous commodities which can be added to each other only 
in terms of values. In more recent times the issues of total capital func-
tion and aggregative production function were studied by F. Fisher. 
 Let us conclude: it seems that efficiency is the only source of capital 
diversity for which a solution can be found in the aggregative model, 
which is why one part of the neo-classical theory of growth if focussed on 
the construction of partially deaggregated models with heterogeneous capi-
tal goods. 
 J. Robinson and N. Kaldor do not believe that capital can be usefully 
measured as an aggregate which together with labour yields an aggregative 
product. Although to different extents, they both lean to the macro-
economic theory of income distribution whose basic hypothesis is that fast 
economic growth leads to high profits, and not vice versa. Savings result-
ing from favorable circumstances lead to further acceleration of capital 
formation (following neo-classical patterns) and contribute to even faster 
economic growth. 
 Major decisions in the neo-classical vision of economy are made by 
consumers, and they are forwarded to the producer by a mechanism of 
perfect competition. A simple model, which was first presented by N. Kal-
dor2 in 1957 is an illustration of a different growth model, as conceived 
by the new Cambridge school, in which the causality order of the neo-
classical model is completely reversed. 
 The key assumption is that competition is not perfect and that agents 
do not charge according the value of their marginal productivity. Another 
important assumption is that technical advances do not occur automatically: 
each community has a certain innovating potential which is determined by 
inherent inventiveness and the level of technical sophistication, but the real 
rate of technical advances depends on how fast the community's economic 
sector accepts innovation possibilities. Innovations involve changes in techni-
cal production - in the aggregate context, they involve the change in the 
proportion in which labour and capital are combined. 
 As in the neo-classical model, the rate of production growth per capita 
is determined by technical advances only, while its absolute level is directly 
related to saving tendencies, but the way in which these results are ob-
tained differs a lot. Namely, Kaldor believes that in circumstances of bal-
anced growth the rate of capital returns and the ratio between capital and 
production are determined by income distribution, and the chief initiator 
of the process of growth is not the consumer but the producer, whose 
“readiness to adopt technical change is combined with a wish to invest 
capital in business undertakings” determines both the growth rate and the 
product distribution, which adds a Keynesian touch to the model as a 
 
  2For Kaldor's theory see: “A model of economic growth”, Economic Journal, 
1957. 
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whole. A more elaborate version of this model was presented by Kaldor 
in 1961 in cooperation with Mirrlees3, where the basic difference lies in 
the fact that capital goods of different age are not homogeneous and the 
total amount of capital thus becomes a dubious concept. 
 Government which would like its economy to follow a growth pattern 
involving maximum consumption would have to create a fiscal system 
which would encourage wage spending and profit reinvestment as much as 
possible. An alternative would be to direct the fiscal and monetary policies 
on maintaining the market interest rate as close as possible to the long-
run rate of economic growth. In order to be able to assess the results of 
government investment, public expenditure, taxation and money supply must 
be explicitly introduced into the analysis. 
 A dynamic model including the government and money was published 
as early as 1955 by J. Tobin4, and in 1956 in one of his texts5 Solow 
admitted that it was necessary to introduce money into the model. In re-
cent times this model has also been studied by Johnson and Sidrausky6. 
The basic conclusion is the following: guaranteed rate of capital growth 
does not depend only on saving tendencies and the ratio between capital 
and production, and the ratio between capital and production in circum-
stances of balance cannot be deduced from the equation of guaranteed 
and natural growth rates if the inflation rate, the rate of money supply 
growth and the rate of public expenditure are not known. 
 The analysis of optimal and efficient allocation in time actually derives 
from the theory of capital and growth, and it owes it ascent to Malin-
vaud, Dorfman, Samuelson and Solow, who introduced the concept of ef-
ficient growth. The size of capital given in the initial period is supposed 
to reach its maximum, with the consumption following any pattern speci-
fied in advance. This is how the problem previously dealt by von Neu-
mann, when he had sought a maximal growth rate, was formulated in a 
more general form. T.C. Koopmans7 also joined this discussion emphasizing 
 
  3Kaldor N., Mirrlees, J.A.: “A new model of economic growth”, Review of 
Economics Studies, 1961. A similar model where technological advance is explicitly 
seen as the result of cumulative experience is the model by K.J. Arrow: “The 
economic implications of learning by doing”, Review of Economics Studies, 1967. 
  4Tobin, J.: “A dynamic aggregative model”, Journal of Political Economy, 1955. 
  5Solow, R.M.: “A contribution to the theory of economic growth”, Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 1956. 
  6Johnson, H.G.: “The neo-classical one-sector growth mode”, Economica, 1966; 
Sidrausky, M.: “Inflation and economic growth”, Journal of Political Economy, 1967, 
and “Rational choice and patterns of growth”, Journal of Political Economy, 1969. 
  7Koopmans, T.C.: “Economic growth at a maximal rate”, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 3/1964, p. 355-394. 
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the close relationship between efficient and optimal growth since both have 
steady state solutions. 
 F. Modigliany has come up with an alternative theory, according to 
which the constancy of the ratio between capital and production is not ac-
cidental. On the contrary, he attempts to explain it in terms of people's 
mental decisions about wealth, consumption and saving. He attaches enor-
mous importance to savings which spread throughout life and the purpose 
of which is to provide for old age. 
 The “new theory of growth” is associated with P. Romer, R.E. Lucas, 
E. Helpman and G. Grossmann8 who base this theory on the following 
assumptions: 
- Endogenous innovation stimulates economic growth. So far innovation has 
always been considered exogenous. 
- In contrast to previous “recognition” of diminishing returns only, produc-
tion structure shows increasing returns. 
- As opposed to perfect competition as the only normal state, some mo-
nopolistic market structure is necessary. 
- There is a difference between optimal and balanced growth. So far only 
balanced growth has been considered optimal. 
 Furthermore, the theory is based on the assumption that individual de-
cision makers learn rationally, and not by adaptation. This means that they 
do not change their behavior gradually, responding to new information or 
different circumstances, but adopt new decision making rules fast and dis-
continuously. In making decisions people are supposed to be turned to the 
future and their expectations, and not to their past and experience. This 
is why any theory that assumes only gradual changes in behavior and 
flexible expectations is clearly wrong. 
 If markets provide full realization at all times, sources of fluctuation 
must be sought in the shift of the supply and demand curve, and not in 
movements from or towards their intersection. Labour demand curves and 
marginal productivity curves shift with technological changes; supply de-
mands shift with changes in taste, especially in preferences between work 
and leisure. Since intertemporal optimization exists on both sides of the 
market, rational expectations regarding future technologies and tastes are 
significant. These shifts lead to smooth waves of established cycles due to 
autoregression of exogenous breakthroughs of technology and taste. It is 
 
  8Romer, P.: “Increasing Returns and Long Run Growth”, Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol. 94, 1986, p. 1002-1087; Lucas, R.E.: “On the Mechanics of 
Economic Development”, Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 22, 1988, p. 3-42; 
Grossman, G.; Helpman, E.: “Product Development and International Trade”, 
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 97, 1989, p. 1261-1283. 
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assumed that waves of economic activity simply reflect technology and taste 
waves in the background. 
 Joint assumptions on full market realization and rational expectations 
are essential as well as ad hoc specification on information available to 
buyers and sellers. 
 This model explains roughly the same observations as the Keynesian 
theory and Phelps-Friedman's hypothesis, but with different implications re-
garding the policies of the two models. A policy can never make more 
than a temporary difference in actual results, and even that temporary dif-
ference is always distorted. Policy makers can bring about permanent 
growth of production and employment only through a series of unexpected 
severe inflationary pressures. Private decision makers know as much as 
public decision makers, and by definition there is hardly any opportunity 
for the newcomers to the market to realize above-average returns rates, 
and if there is no such opportunity, there is no one who could improve 
the current economic performance. 
 According to neo-classical economics, the political process usually plays 
the role of the rational being which is trying to meet the “public inter-
est”. For the purposes of economic models, this role is most of the time 
interpreted as a problem of the welfare function maximization - usually 
the sum of the producer surplus and the consumer surplus. However, the 
very hypothesis on the optimizing conduct of the political process is ques-
tionable, because the “basic problem lies in the inherent impotence of the 
policy as a process of making economic decisions. Experience suggests that 
the political process is limited in its ability to accept consistent goals, set 
priorities and choose between competing economic programs, particularly 
when such decisions require understanding of complex technical problems 
and continuous update of complex information. For example, while econo-
mists research the dynamics between inflation and unemployment and dis-
cuss in detail whether the trade off between unemployment and inflation 
is possible, the political process has enormous difficulty accepting the idea 
that such a trade off is necessary in the first place. In reality government 
behavior alternates between giving priority to reducing unemployment and 
giving priority to reducing inflation”. (Grossmann, 1980). 
 
 Macroeconomic stability and growth 
 Macroeconomic balance is defined as such a constellation of inner and 
outer balance that is consistent with dynamic and steady growth. In other 
words, dynamic balance is defined as a situation in which growth is consis-
tent with low and steady inflation and with a sustainable balance-of-pay-
ments position. This is based on the assumption that in the short-run high 
inflation is compatible with growth and that the balance of payments defi-
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cit can accelerate growth, but in the medium- and long-run high inflation 
and increasingly high indebtedness have a negative impact on growth. 
 In the absence of a general growth model which would integrate 
macroeconomic balance and growth, our attention is focussed on the analy-
sis of macroeconomic balance within the framework of the analytical model 
of a small and open economy. We will try to suggest that stabilization as-
sumes elements of growth in order to be sustainable. If they are missing, 
stabilization tends to fail due to recession resulting from problems in in-
come distribution. Some social groups are not willing to participate, and 
those who are forced to participate are brought to the brink of physical 
existence during the long periods of stabilization. 
 Croatian economic reform resembles that in Eastern European states. 
Price reform, trade liberalization, privatization and the restructuring of 
companies represent the major reform areas. Here, too, the “laissez faire” 
approach prevails instead of an active industrial policy. The emphasis is 
put on the macroeconomic context, and the market and its agents are 
supposed to adjust accordingly on their own. 
 Since 1992 or rather since the second half of 1991 the loss of the 
former Yugoslavia market and the impact of war resulted in the decline 
in production, savings and investments. War risks have had a negative im-
pact on the exports, but the concurrent redirection of production from the 
market of former Yugoslavia to export markets has neutralized that effect 
and reduced the decline in exports. Nevertheless, the imports have been 
declining due to the fall in production and investments. Apart from that, 
by gaining independence Croatia found itself in a structurally different 
situation. Namely, in former Yugoslavia due to surpluses in its current ac-
count balance Croatia was the supplier of foreign currency which was 
spent on the state level. Because of that, when Croatia became independ-
ent, its currency's real exchange rate, which balances Croatia's foreign ac-
counts, increased. 
 What constellation of fundamentals - savings, investments, public expen-
diture, trade protection and exports - which are essential both to macro-
economic balance and to growth, suits a small, open economy which 
wishes to maximize the standard of living in the long run? According to 
the theory of growth, savings and investments in physical and human capi-
tal ought to be as large as possible, public expenditure should be as small 
as possible in order not to replace investments and exports, and exports 
should grow at a dynamic rate. Furthermore, it is necessary to make sure 
that the stage of growth accompanied by debt accumulation and direct in-
vestment inflow is followed by a stage of growth accompanied by a posi-
tive current account balance, so that the accumulated debt can be continu-
ously serviced. The growth rate should therefore reach at least the level 
of real interest rate on the world market (in the medium-run it should be 
at least 5-6% with a tendency to reach a long-run growth rate of 2-3%, 
which corresponds the long-run real interest rate on the world market). 
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 What do these variables look like in Croatia? Domestic savings rate is 
halved compared to those in the pre-war period and represents 13-14% of 
the GNP. Gross investments in fixed funds have reached a slightly higher 
level - they are about 15% of the GNP. Public expenditure directly re-
duces savings, which is also reduced by the deficit in the public sector. 
Also, the poor financial structure of Croatian economy, high fiscal pressure 
and fierce competition with imports heavily aggravate the effectuation of 
the money supply increment in an increase of home supply of goods and 
services. Transfers of accumulated foreign currency reserves enable the 
maintenance of a steady rate of exchange on the foreign currency market 
at a level that does not cover the difference between the current domestic 
and world labour productivity for the majority of both exported and im-
ported products. Due to the low level of income, the level of marginal 
propensity to save is low, and due to high interest rates, the marginal 
propensity to invest is also low. Quality, assortment, sales terms and tech-
nological production level represent an additional obstacle to a powerful 
expansion of commodity exports to more demanding markets, and at the 
same time the possibilities of placing some product on the home market 
are increasingly limited. 
 All this suggests that the current constellation of key categories in 
Croatian economy is not particularly favorable for autonomous development 
of strong short-term impulses that would stimulate economic growth at the 
same time maintaining relative stability of prices at their current level. It 
also suggests that the possibilities of short-term effects of the economic 
policy in terms of stimulating economic growth at a low inflation rate are 
rather limited. 
 At a low inflation rate it is clearly difficult to expect dynamic eco-
nomic growth. Low inflation over a long period of time and the participa-
tion of public sector income in the gross national product of about 60% 
(out of which one third represents defense expenditure) replace savings 
and investments, generate costs that are incompatible with the level of ex-
change rate on the foreign currency market and support heavy demand for 
loans for funding regular business operation at a high risk of their 
repayment and at high interest rates. More dynamic economic growth 
cannot be expected if the state is directly or indirectly involved in the 
operation of economic agents and in the absence of measures that would 
directly stimulate investments in the private sector and new openings and 
with continuous pressures on the banking system to socialize certain 
problems. 
 All this suggests that economic policy has to focus on changing the 
factors it can influence in a direction consistent with dynamic steady 
growth, at the same time sustaining low and steady inflation. Through 
macroeconomic policy, structural policies and the development of an insti-
tutionalized framework, the economic policy should create a stable yet 
flexible environment which will ensure such incentives that would make the 
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adjustment process result in increased savings, investments and competition 
ability that would ensure maximal involvement in the international 
economy. 
 
 Politico-economic structural adjustment alternatives 
 In terms of theory and practice, we are now going through a produc-
tive period of examining orthodox hypotheses which do not only concern 
countries in transition, but also market economies themselves. At the same 
time, from the point of view of economic policy this is a period of great 
confusion in which there is very little consensus on most issues. 
 Problems related to the achievement of growth in circumstances of sta-
bilization primarily lie in the fact that frozen resources or resources set 
aside for the economy cannot automatically reach export production. 
Namely, companies' readiness to invest in exports also depends on the sta-
bility of expectations and on their trust in the stability of the announced 
system. Neither prices nor competitive markets are sufficient to ensure 
growth, since they do not ensure social consensus, nor solve problems of 
the abilities and knowledge left behind. This is why stabilization cannot be 
lasting without defining industrial or development policies. The need for 
long-run growth must be treated in the same way as the need for stabili-
zation, otherwise it is not possible to change people's expectations. This 
requires strategic coordination in the economy, and this requires the devel-
opment of certain mechanisms. 
 “In the long run, economic growth results from the interplay of incen-
tives and abilities. Abilities define the best that can be achieved, and in-
centives affect the use of abilities and really stimulate their expansion, re-
newal or disappearance. In advanced economies abilities largely refer to 
human capital supply, savings and the existing capital stock, as well as 
technical and organizational skills needed for their use. Incentives largely 
originate from the product market and are more or less reflected in factor 
markets thus determining the efficiency of the use of abilities. Both the 
incentives and abilities function within an institutional framework. Institu-
tions set rules of the game and are directly involved in the game. They 
act in the way that they change the abilities and incentives and they can 
change behaviors by changing attitudes and expectations”.9 
 Economic incentives are primarily determined by the macroeconomic 
policy, and the existing abilities are advanced or set back by the industrial 
policy. As neither of the two policies can exist in an institutional vacuum, 
each of them is formulated within the existing institutional framework. At 
 
  9OECD (1987), Structural Adjustment and Economic Performance, Paris, p. 18. 
cited from S. Rado{evi} (1994): Konkurentni izvoz Hrvatske, Koncepcijski ogledi i 
empirijska istra`ivanja, p. 152. 
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the same time changes in these policies usually require institutional 
changes in order to be implemented in the first place. All these three 
elements are contained in the development policy of economies which are 
being successfully restructured. 
 Elaboration of policies and mechanisms, even their rough illustration ex-
ceeds the scope of this paper. Therefore we shall “draw the conclusion 
that there is an interdependence between institutionalized circumstances 
(order policy), and macroeconomic processes and microeconomic reactions 
(process policy). All the three groups of activities are necessary and have 
been noted in “virtuous circle” economies (Rado{evi}, 1994, p. 160). 
 Controversy regarding the role of the state and the market in the de-
velopment process keeps coming up in economic debates. On the one 
hand, some, in the best laissez-faire tradition, believe that it is the market 
that can best move scarce resource in the direction which would make 
their use most efficient, while others, on the other hand, think that the 
market works with numerous failures which is why it should be directed 
by additional state intervention. In the theory of economics, and particu-
larly in development economics, the former approach is usually called neo-
liberal, and the latter structuralistic (Chenery, 1979). 
 The neo-liberal approach identifies the desired structural change with 
the result of the general market competition process. Rooted structural im-
balances and problems result from slow market adjustments and obstacles 
set to free competition. 
 Failures of the state include in the first place the following: 1) inher-
ent shortsightedness of the political process since political mandates usually 
last several years, while the development and implementation of an eco-
nomic change takes much longer. Politicians are interested in the success 
of their short-term stabilization policy rather than in a long-run policy the 
results of which become evident only after their mandates are over. 2) 
Making and supervision of state decisions imply that the state responds to 
changes at a much slower rate than private entrepreneurs, and decision 
making in the state sector must follow a complex administrative procedure. 
Once a decision is made following parliamentary procedure, its supervision 
is aggravate by the fact that its implementation is forwarded to a state 
organization, so the parliament rarely receives timely and detailed feedback 
on the implementation of the decision. 
 And lastly 3) relying on state assistance implies the domination of a 
small interest group, which is led solely by its own interests and is there-
fore often hostile to other citizen groups. When an interest group captures 
state intervention (capture hypothesis) it is not willing to give it up. It 
engages in extensive lobbying, bribery of state administration and invests in 
legal advisors in order to get to the source of rent which some other 
companies have already benefited from (rent seeking activities). 
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 The structuralistic approach is based on the hypothesis that continuity 
of market relations is by no means a spontaneous process. The market is 
a comprehensive form of regulation, but it can direct economic agents 
only when the markets themselves are structured in the way that they re-
duce uncertainty, channel social conflicts, prevent the loss of dislocation 
for important agents, define expansion orientation and sustain macro-
economic stability. Market failures which are usually pointed to in order 
to justify state intervention include external effects (negative and positive), 
volume economies and asymmetrical information (Grossman, 1990). 
 The 1990s have brought a certain convergence of attitudes. In other 
words, the structuralistic and neo-liberal views have grown much closer and 
a certain theoretical consensus has been reached. Today many authors 
claim that the usual distinction between the role of the state and the role 
of market in development is actually just a choice between “imperfects al-
ternatives” (Wolf, 1993), and that serious implementation of the develop-
ment policy cannot be based on a strict distinction between the two roles 
(De Bandt, 1994, Oughton, 1995). 
 Under the influence of the neo-classical perspective the role of the 
state is seen only as a role of someone who ensures the functioning of 
the “free market”. But development literature shows the complexity of the 
state's role. Non-market and collectivist institutions are underestimated in 
their contribution to the functioning of free markets. Their significance lies 
in the fact that market failures or deficiencies are not exceptions, but 
rather a rule. The absence of such mechanisms is termed articulation defi-
ciencies, with the term “mechanism of economic articulation” implying a 
powerful network of formal and informal connections. In successful econo-
mies these connections are involved in the dynamics of market forces, they 
negotiate on market failures and in other ways perform functions required 
in the operation of the complex economic mechanism. 
 The author of this paper if fully aware of the fact that some of these 
hypotheses might be resented in a country with painful historical experi-
ence of state and parastate intervention. However, the basic assumption 
here is that market economy in circumstances of institutional vacuum rep-
resents great uncertainty for economic agents which then obstructs any 
long-run entrepreneurial activity. The exceptions are short-run activities, 
which are then usurious or mercantilist. Confirmation of this can be found 
in the structure of newly established Croatian companies. 
 Croatian institutions of economic articulation are powerless, they operate 
on an ad hoc basis and are ignored. Its flexibility will not be reflected 
solely in market mechanisms but also in non-market ones, in other words, 
in mechanisms of economic articulation.10 Major elements of the institu-
 
  10In the work by P. Katzenstein: Small States in World Markets, Cornell 
University Press, 1985, adaptability of small, well-articulated European countries and 
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tional framework that is to be developed in economies in transitions in-
clude: civil law, protection system for the unemployed, effective bankruptcy 
system etc. However, each market economy represent a specific 
institutional context, which is why the discussion on “pure” market econ-
omy is only of limited value. There isn't a single market economy, but an 
institutionally very specific type of market economy. Since there is no 
market economy without an attribute, the question is what kind of market 
economy is Croatia after? 
 On this occasion we would like to emphasize that we should not give 
in to new ideological blindness which would again ignore perverted and 
uncontrolled forms of state intervention. Rules of the game need to be 
clearly defined, which requires providing minimal political consensus and a 
developed administrative structure which will be able to build cooperative 
relations with the private sector. Croatia is undergoing a difficult process 
of developing an institutional structure which can serve as the basis for 
any neo-liberal project. It is a political process, because it involves the 
elimination of the chief source of power for individual social groups. 
 The major problem highlighted by the failure of orthodox marketization 
lies in ignoring the institutional foundations of market economy, which 
marks the limitations of the prevailing orthodox approach to the transfor-
mation of economies in transitions. Its orientation towards only those poli-
cies that enable market incentives suggests that this conceptual framework 
needs to be broadened. 
 In conclusion, public expenditure which reaches about 28% of GNP is 
too high in terms of the need for increased domestic savings. In accor-
dance with the theory of endogenous growth, the share of public expendi-
ture reserved for education, science, technology and health should be in-
creased, as well as investments in human capital, and this should be done 
at the expense of defence expenditure. Further liberalization of the trade 
system and opening towards the world are also desirable incentives for the 
increase of exports, and low and stable inflation rate is essential to the 
implementation of a scenario which would lead to a significant and stable 
growth. 
 However, the author of this text would particularly like to insist on the 
hypothesis that stabilization is not automatically followed by growth, and 
macroeconomic policy alone is not sufficient for Croatia's competitiveness. 
This means that national policies comprising all sectors (monetary, customs, 
exchange rate policy etc.) are insufficient to make economic growth possi-
ble and enhance competitiveness. The original macroeconomic concept of 
the sources of economic dynamics and competitiveness seems particularly 
inadequate for a small economy such as Croatian. Accordingly, the devel-
 
regions with a high level of political autonomy and cohesion of various social 
partners is emphasized. 
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opment philosophy will have to be revised and more significance will have 
to be attached to sector-specific and microeconomic aspects of competitive-
ness. A policy must develop the environment and mechanisms for market 
niches, which are a small economy's only prospects. 
 The process of state transformation and the establishment of a new 
system of “regulation” in a society requires the political consensus of all 
social groups, since the process of gaining competitive advantages is an 
immanently political process, which makes it significant in terms of con-
tinuous initiation of the process of institutional and non-institutional coor-
dination of politically different perspectives of economic development. This 
means that the relations between trade unions and the state, as well as 
those between new owners must to a certain extent be cooperative. 
 This leads us to the conclusion that policy makers should be aware of 
the fact that the political dimension of current and development policies is 
a political and administrative requirement for Croatian transition from a 
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